THE RISE, FALL, AND REBIRTH OF ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS
by John Nordlie
For Military Applications of Space course
1992
HISTORY
The concept of anti-satellite weapons (or "ASAT"s in the
jargon of government contractors) is nothing new. The concept
was given low priority by the armed services until the launch of
Sputnik I in 1957. In this era of cold-war hysteria, Sputnik
represented the idea of Russian superiority in space technology,
and the ability of the Soviets to bomb anywhere on earth without
risking their planes. To the American people, Sputnik could be
an atomic weapon just as easily as the scientific satellite it
really was. The satellites' launch galvanized the U.S. military
machine into action. The military knew that an orbiting spacecraft need not
necessarily be a weapon to be offensive in nature. Studies by
the Advanced Research Planning Agency (ARPA) had shown that
space would be an ideal place to conduct optical reconnaissance
and collect electronic intelligence. At the time, proposals to
design a system to destroy such orbiting spacecraft were met with
a relative lack of enthusiasm ("Why design a weapon to destroy
what doesn't even exist?"). The launch of Sputnik made the
development of an ASAT device not only plausible, but much more
desireable. After the launch of Sputnik, the armed services started
conducting their own ASAT research programs independent of the
ones sanctioned by the government. The thinking was that when
and if the official policy of the peaceful use of space in
scientific research went away, a particular service might be in a better
position in comparison to the others. Although ARPA was given
the formal responsibility to coordinate this research, the
services soon found ways to circumvent the regulations [1]. Since
projects costing less than $500,000 didn't need to be itemized,
the services chopped up their individual ASAT research programs
into $499,000 pieces to avoid scrutiny. The official ARPA
project was named Project Defender, and covered defense from both
satellites and ballistic missiles. ARPA requested the Air
Force's Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) contract for
the "study of weapon systems to combat hostile satellites" in
1958. ARPA also later got NASA into the act of researching ASAT
and ballistic missile defense (BMD) technology. Most of these
studies were only conducted on paper, but a few did go farther
than that:
The High Altitude Nuclear Test Program was a study to
determine the effect of a nuclear detonation in space on
satellites and space itself. In project Argus, three rockets
carrying nuclear weapons were detonated in 1958 to study the
behavior of free electrons in the earth's magnetic field. The
military was also interested in the effect these explosions would
have on the Explorer IV satellite, which would be used to monitor
the tests. Argus showed that "A nuclear explosion in space
produces three kinds of effects of military importance. The high
energy radiation including particles from the explosion produces
effects on space; the whirling high energy electrons generate
radio noise; and the delayed radiation from the fission products
can affect radio transmission [1]. It was observed later that the
electrons striking the metal surfaces of satellites produce
bursts of X-rays, which can damage electronics. A later project
(Fishbowl) which detonated a 1.4 megaton yield warhead at an
altitude of 248 miles caused considerable havoc with Pacific
communications, power systems in Hawaii, and damaged three
satellites in orbit. The military decided that this adverse
effect on friendly hardware would be an inevitable result of the
use of high-yield nuclear warheads in space.
Project Bold Orion was designed to research the feasibility
of an air-launched ballistic missile, but was also used to test a
possible ASAT system. In it's final test version, the two-stage
rocket came within four miles of the Explorer VI satellite,
providing proof of concept.
The Navy was not to be left out on all this ASAT research.
During the Air Force tests, the Navy announced it's "Early
Spring" ASAT concept. Based on a missile that would climb to
orbital height and hover there, waiting for the satellite to come
into range, and then destroy it, Early Spring covered a variety
of proposals between 1960 and 1964. One concept was of mounting
a modified Sparrow air to air missile on a Polaris sub-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM). This concept was abandoned because the
department of defense didn't want the current stock of SLBM's
used for anything other than nuclear weapon delivery. Project
Skipper proposed to use a modified Scout rocket launched from a
ship or sub, and would kill a satellite with a cloud of metal
pellets or rods. This differed from most ASAT designs in that it
used a kinetic energy weapon rather than a nuclear warhead to
destroy the satellite. Skipper never went beyond the drawing
board. A few other Navy projects followed, but generated little
enthusiasm.
The early 1960's saw the beginning of research to use laser
and maser technology in an ASAT role. Rather than blast the
satellite to little bits, lasers or masers would be used to
render the satellite inoperable by attacking it's sensors or
electronics. In 1965 Arthur Kantrowitz suggested using particle
beam weapons for ASAT systems. Funding for this project was
rather low priority, however. In 1962 General Curtis LeMay
warned that the Soviets knew the importance of laser and particle
beam ASAT capability, and that whatever we did, they would go
ahead with the development of ASAT systems based on these
technologies. Emphasis remained on rocket powered interceptors,
however.
The first full-scale ASAT system research was project SAINT.
SAINT was short for Satellite Inspector, which was supposed to be
a system which would establish an orbit similar to the target
satellite, and observe it with an imaging sensor. The plan was
to integrate a destructive capability into the co-orbiter, which
could destroy a satellite if it was of an offensive nature. The
"kill" capability was later deleted from the design, but never
from the minds of the researchers. SAINT got a boost during
December of 1959, when a "mystery satellite" was picked up on
radar. Fears as to the purpose of this new Soviet satellite ran
rampant, until it was determined that the target was not, in
fact, a Soviet satellite, but instead the second stage booster
for the Discovery V satellite, causing more than a bit of
embarrassment to the folks at DoD. The lessons of the unknown
"satellite" sunk in, though, and project SAINT was given the
go-ahead. The project suffered from funding problems and political
set backs, and was even attacked by certain religious groups
protesting the irreverent use of the term "saint". The program
was renamed "Hawkeye", but later changed to Program 720.
Suffering from technical, conceptual, and financial problems, the
project was canceled in 1962. The Army also had it's ideas
about ASAT systems. Project
MUDFLAP proposed using a Nike Zeus missile modified for ASAT use
in 1960. This was the first program that blurred the distinction
between anti-satellite (ASAT) research and anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) research. The similar design goals of the two missions
made this inevitable. The Nike Zeus system consisted of a solid
fuel, three stage rocket carrying a 1 megaton range nuclear
warhead. The system's maximum altitude was about 150 nautical
miles. The project was eventually canceled, and in 1972 the
Army's involvement in ASAT research ceased.
One program that actually became operational was Program
437. 437 used a Thor booster to carry a 1.5 megaton yield
nuclear warhead to a target up to 200 nautical miles high. The
system was deployed on Johnston Atoll. In the launch scenario,
two missiles were counted down simultaneously in case there was a
last minute problem with one of them. One variant of program 437
was program 437 X (later changed to 437 AP). This used the same
launch hardware to boost a camera/film return capsule of
Discovery design to the orbit of a Soviet satellite and take
pictures of it (SAINT's mission). Test data of this program are
still classified, so it's effectiveness is unknown. With the
signing of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, the threat of orbital
bombardment was reduced, and program 437's funding began to dry
up. 437 finally died in 1975. After the cancellation of 437, a
number of follow-on programs using a non-nuclear warhead on the
437 hardware enjoyed temporary success, then they too were
canceled.
Project Dynasoar proposed the development of a hypersonic
manned glide vehicle that would skip off the upper atmosphere,
then re-enter and land on a conventional runway. One of the many
proposed missions of Dynasoar was ASAT use, as well as
reconnaissance and intercontinental bombardment. The project,
later known as the X-20, was canceled in December 1963, due to
cost and development difficulties.
In 1971, with the demise of program 437 looming in the
future, the Air Force proposed project SPIKE. SPIKE would use a
non-nuclear missile launched from an F-106 fighter plane to
destroy enemy satellites. The project had it's funding
completely cut off in FY 1973.
During the Ford administration, a Space Defense Initiative
was begun, which basically revamped earlier ideas of developing
non-nuclear weapons to destroy satellites, as well as working on
technology to harden U.S. satellites to make them less vulnerable
to attack. In March 1975, the magazine "Aviation Week & Space
Technology printed an article that referred to the Miniature
Homing Vehicle (MHV), the first real public reference to an Air
Force ASAT program or component [3].
The MHV was a small kinetic energy weapon, launched from an
F-15 and guided to it's target by a long wave infrared sensor in
its nose. FY 1977 included money to continue development of the
MHV, as well as several satellite survivability technologies.
Detection of tracking and laser attack were two these.
The Carter administration continued development of the MHV,
it being the most promising of the ASAT proposals then under
research. Choice of launch platform (F-15, with a Boeing short
range attack missile and a Vought Altair III booster chosen for
the first and second stage) was finalized. A program to provide
a "low tech" backup system to the MHV was also begun. This
backup program was based on a vehicle that used explosive pellets
to disable a satellite, and was considered possible to build from
"off the shelf" technology. The MHV was finally tested against
an aging Army communications satellite in 1985, successfully
destroying the target [2]. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) also
compiled a prioritized list of Soviet space vehicles to destroy
in the event of war.
One area of research that had taken off during the Ford
administration, and was being hotly debated during Carter's, was
the use of lasers in space. The suspected blinding of an
American satellite in November of 1975 add fuel to the flames.
Proponents of laser and directed energy weapons pointed out that,
even with the formidable technical difficulties of developing and
lifting such a system to orbit, space was an ideal environment
for such weapons. Opponents argued that "conventional" weapons
systems could accomplish the same objectives, while costing many
times less than the new technologies. Research on particle beam
weapons was carried out from 1978 to the present by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) at Lawrence Livermore
and Los Alamos labs. This research suggested that a beam of
accelerated neutral charge particles would be useful in both ASAT
and ABM roles (charged particles are easier to accelerate, but
are affected by the earth's magnetic field, which makes pointing
difficult). Funding for the project was kept at a "technology
development" (low) in 1980, and research continues to this day.
In contrast to the particle beam programs, research on high
energy laser systems was considered much more practical. Three
main areas of research was supported by congress: high energy
hydrogen fluoride lasers, the optics necessary to direct them,
and a tracking and pointing system to accurately point them at
something. Funding for the Air Force and Navy's individual high
energy laser research projects was cut to free up money for these
"big three".
The Regan administration continued the development of ASAT
systems, but gave the policy of ASAT deterrence much more credit
than the previous administrations had. Just how much President
Reagan believed in ASAT and ABM systems came as a shock to many
people. Research was sped up on the "big three" laser projects,
and the MHV development was continued. In the so-called "star
wars" speech, Reagan shocked everyone in announcing the Strategic
Defense Initiative program; a program to develop a "leak-proof"
ABM system. The SDI program created controversy the day it was
announced. Many thought that such a system could not be built
then or in the foreseeable future. Others said that the problem
only needed to be tackled one step at a time. With the
possibility of big-money research contracts in the air, aerospace
companies charged full-steam into the project.
The use of space based directed energy weapons was never
mentioned in the speech, but their use in the system has become
almost a given assumption, hence the popular term "star wars" was
attached to the project by the public. Controversy over this
system continues to this day, especially with the breakup of the
Soviet Union. Many people see this as losing the only opponent
the system was designed to combat, while others point to the
possibility of third world countries obtaining nuclear weapons
which might be used against the U.S. The debate rages on.
PRESENT (1992)
It is important to mention SDI in this paper because the
weapons systems designed for the SDI program could very easily be
converted into an ASAT system on short notice. The mission of
destroying ICBM's or ballistic warheads closely matches the
mission of destroying orbital spacecraft, the main differences
being the height of the orbit (or trajectory), the number of
targets, and the response time needed by the system: very fast
for SDI (minutes), and longer for ASAT (hours, days, weeks,
etc.). Undoubtedly, the large amounts of research being done
for the SDI program will be invaluable to ASAT system designers
in years to come.
Another role that ASAT systems provide is that of a
bargaining chip. In the past, the Soviets have expressed
interest in limiting the deployment of orbiting weapons systems,
such as ASAT and ABM systems. The Reagan administration rejected
these proposals as being "hypocritical and insincere", which
annoyed some members of the public [1]. This suggests that Reagan's
position was one of "these programs are very important, and will
continue". Reagan did not put faith in the Mutually Assured
Destruction (MAD) policy, which said that no one would start a
war knowing that their country would be destroyed along with
their enemy. Reagan believed with great faith in the policy of
SDI, which was presented as a "peace shield" over the U.S., and
could not be used as a first strike weapon. The possible ASAT
uses of the SDI system were a continued worry to the Soviets,
however.
FUTURE
The future of ASAT systems technology seems assured. Unless
a major policy effort is made to ban all research on ASAT and ABM
systems, the importance of space-borne reconnaissance and
military communications demands the ability to strike at space
vehicles. The current policy of "let's be open about what we're
up to" is an effective tension reducer, but may not always be the
case in the future. I think that ASAT systems are an important
part of our national defense, and their funding should be
continued, but that spin-offs from SDI technology will make ASAT
development a much easier proposition, so such funding need not
be our most important goal.
REFERENCES
[1] Stares, Paul B. The militarization of space,
Cornell University Press. Ithaca, New York. 1982.
[2] Vedda, Dr. James. Professor Space Studies. Class lectures.
[3] Aviation Week & Space Technology. March, 1975.
OTHER REFERENCES
Space News, various authors, 1975 - 1991
Johnson-Freese, Joan. "Changing Patterns of International
Cooperation in Space". Orbit book company, Malabar, Florida. 1990
McDougall, Walter A. "...The Heavens and the Earth". Basic Books,
Inc. New York. 1985
Linenthal, Edward Trabor. "Symbolic Defense". University of
Illinois press. Urbana & Chicago. 1989
"War and Peace in the Nuclear Age". Public television.
November, 1991
"The Eagle and the Bear". Mind extension university television.
November, 1991
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